Dividend policy of state-owned enterprises

Miroslav Nedelchev ()
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Miroslav Nedelchev: Higher education Department, Ministry of education and science

Entrepreneurship, 2024, vol. 12, issue 2, 60-73

Abstract: The purpose of the article is to present the dividend policy of state-owned enterprises in Bulgaria. Economic reforms over the past 30 years have attracted public attention to state ownership and its contributions to the society and economy. The “principal-agent” theory is accepted as a basis in the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises. The findings of the article define the dividends of state-owned enterprises both as a part of the budget policy and as a tool for the implementation of large economic projects. The statutory grounds for state ownership are not reflected in the annual financial reports of state-owned enterprises. The lack of a state ownership policy, including a clear and predictable policy on the dividends of state-owned enterprises, can lead to a number of problems such as macroeconomic imbalances and increasing domestic debt.

Keywords: Bulgaria; corporate governance; agent theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 H11 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:neo:epjour:v:12:y:2024:i:2:p:60-73

DOI: 10.37708/ep.swu.v12i2.5

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