THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
Miroslav Nedelchev ()
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Miroslav Nedelchev: Economic Research Institute, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Economics and Management, 2019, vol. 16, issue 1, 10-18
The aim of the article is to present the theories of remuneration. Both classical and modern theories are presented within their time and economic environment. The anchor of article is the model principal-agent and reducing asymmetric information through remuneration. The conclusions of the article define a wide range of theories. All theories aim to solve the principal-agent problem through a new tool - the remuneration. The nuances of individual theories can be determined from the different periods of their occurrence and from the dominant economic environment for the essence of the remuneration.
Keywords: corporate governance; information asymmetry; principal-agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G35 J33 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:neo:journl:v:16:y:2019:i:1:p:10-18
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