Reciprocity, Self-Interest and the Welfare State

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis

Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 2000, vol. 26, 33-53

Abstract: In the advanced economies, a substantial fraction of total income is regularly transferred from the better off to the less well off, with the approval of the electorate. Economists have for the most part misunderstood this phenomenon due to their endorsement of an empirically implausible theory of selfish human motivation. Understanding why citizens regularly vote for parties endorsing redistributive policies requires a reconsideration of the behavioral assumptions of economics. We find that voters support the welfare state because it conforms to deeply held norms of reciprocity and conditional obligations to others.

JEL-codes: D30 D72 I30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:noj:journl:v:26:y:2000:p:33-53

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