Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments
Min Shi and
Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 2003, vol. 29, 67-76
This paper provides a review of recent developments in the theory and evidence of political budget cycles. Specifically, we discuss three areas where significant progress has been made. First, new theoretical explanations (models) have been proposed where political budget cycles arise as the result of a moral hazard problem between the government and the electorate. Second, more sophisticated empirical methods, in particular, time series methods appropriate for dynamic panel data regressions, have been adopted in cross-country analyses. Last but not least, the focus of recent studies has shifted from industrialized countries to all (including developing) countries, and from the existence of political budget cycles to the magnitude and composition (revenue vs. spending) of these cycles.
Keywords: Political budget cycles; dynamic panel estimation; developing countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E62 P16 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:noj:journl:v:29:y:2003:p:67-76
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