Why is there so little redistribution?

Jo Lind

Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 2005, vol. 31, 111-125

Abstract: In democratic societies with skewed income distributions, simple political economy models predict that the poor will form a coalition to implement high taxes. I review this basic theory and some of its extensions. Then I discuss how we can test the model, and some common pitfalls, before I review the empirical findings. Generally, the empirical support for the theory is weak. I end with a review of selected parts of the literature that tries to explain this lack of empirical support.

JEL-codes: D31 D72 H53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:noj:journl:v:31:y:2005:p:111-125

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