The Survival of the Nordic Welfare State and Social Trust

Urs Steiner Brandt and Gert Svendsen
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Urs Steiner Brandt: Department of Environmental and Business Economy, University of Southern Denmark

Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 2010, vol. 36, 1

Abstract: Why does free riding not escalate in the universal Nordic welfare state? How is it possible to maintain such a cooperative equilibrium where most people tend to cooperate? Our model suggests that the “missing link” is the accumulated stock of cooperation norms in terms of social trust. Arguably, a sufficient number of norm enforcers facilitate this unique collective insurance system.

JEL-codes: B22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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