Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 7. Public Choice under Representative Democracy: Government and Coalitions in Parliament

R. Nureev

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2003, issue 2

Abstract: The specifics of pubic choice under representative democracy are considered in the seventh chapter of the textbook. The factors of forming of coalitions in parliament are analyzed. The methods of voting manipulation including the formulation of Arrow's impossibility theorem are described. The concept of logrolling is distinguished. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2003:id:2001

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2003-2-111-132

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