Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 9. Economics of Bureaucracy

R. Nureev

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2003, issue 4

Abstract: The main features of the economics of bureaucracy are considered in the ninth chapter of the textbook. The models of bureaucracy behavior created by W. Niskanen, G. Tullock, A. Breton, G. Brennan and J. Buchanan are analyzed. Special interests groups are distinguished. The mechanism of lobbying is characterized. The concepts of rent-seeking and corruption are defined. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2003:id:2026

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2003-4-135-157

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