Hostile Takeovers and Anti-takeover Defenses in the Russian Corporate Market

E. Demidova

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2007, issue 4

Abstract: This article analyzes definitions and the role of hostile takeovers at the Russian and European markets for corporate control. It develops the methodology of assessing the efficiency of anti-takeover defenses adapted to the conditions of the Russian market. The paper uses the cost-benefit analysis, where the costs and benefits of the pre-bid and post-bid defenses are compared.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2007:id:1593

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2007-4-70-84

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