Organizational Economics and Models of Incomplete Contracts

A. Skorobogatov

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2007, issue 12

Abstract: The article considers interrelations between economic organization and the opportunities of realizing technological advantages such as demand aggregation, team production and asset specificity. Theoretical results of incomplete contracts literature are analyzed (Hart-Moore, Grossman-Hart and Tirole-Furubotn-Richter models) which touches upon interdependence between contract incompleteness, allocation of property rights and the levels of relationship-specific investment.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2007:id:1683

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2007-12-71-95

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