A Political Economy Model of a Research University

Konstantin Sonin and I. Khovanskaya

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2009, issue 7

Abstract: Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2009:id:901

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2009-7-132-143

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