On the Origins of Administrative Rent: Doing Business in a Russian Region N

A. Oleinik

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2010, issue 5

Abstract: In the article two types of rent are differentiated: resource rent and administrative rent. The latter is linked to restrictions on the access to the field of interactions. The contribution of the theory of public choice and the theory of rent-seeking and directly-unproductive activities is further developed by shifting the emphasis from individual decision-making to interactions between three actors: C, who controls access to the field, A, who gets a competitive edge as a result, and B, who assumes a subjacent position with regard to both A and C, yet still receives a positive gain from transacting. Domination by virtue of a constellation of As, Bs, and Cs interests is illustrated with the help of an in-depth case study of a Russian region. This study combines quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as their triangulation.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2010:id:1025

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2010-5-58-80

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