Right to contestation, patron-client networks, and corruption

P. Orekhovsky ()

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2012, issue 11

Abstract: In the paper the nature of Russian corruption is considered along the lines proposed by D. North, J. Wallis, and B. Weingast. The author considers patron-client networks as basic political and economic actors of the limited access order. The redistributive rent allocated within patron-client networks is not a corruption phenomenon. The main factor that is able to destroy patron-client networks and autonomous centers of power is the right to contestation (liberalization) according to R. Dahl. Realization of that right together with the right to participate in political life enables transition to the open access society.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2012:id:482

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2012-11-101-117

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