Boundedly rational versus optimization-based models of strategic thinking and learning in games

Vincent Crawford

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2014, issue 5

Abstract: The paper is a comment on the article by R. Harstad and R. Selten and considers the tradeoff between bounded rationality and optimization models in the game-theoretic context. The author shows that in most of the models elements of opimization are still retained and that it is thus more productive to further improve the optimization-based modeling rather than to abandon them altogether in favour of bounded rationality.

Date: 2014
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Journal Article: Boundedly Rational versus Optimization-Based Models of Strategic Thinking and Learning in Games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2014:id:640

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-27-44

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