Corruption as “one‑stop‑shop”: theory and empirical analysis

R. Yu. Kochnev, L. I. Polishchuk () and A. Yu. Rubin

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2018, issue 9

Abstract: We present the comparative analysis of the impact of centralized and decentralized corruption for private sector. Theory and empirical evidence point out to a “double jeopardy” of decentralized corruption which increases the burden of corruption upon private firms and weakens the incentives of bureaucracy to provide public production inputs, such as infrastructure. These outcomes are produced by simultaneous free-riding and the tragedy of the commons effects. The empirical part of the paper utilizes data of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance project.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2018:id:450

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2018-9-32-51

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