Explicit and Implicit Incentives for Multiple Agents

Jonathan Glover

Foundations and Trends(R) in Accounting, 2012, vol. 7, issue 1, 1-71

Abstract: This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has.

Keywords: Explicit contracting; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Implicit contracting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:fntacc:1400000020

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