Corporate Governance, Board Oversight, and CEO Turnover

Volker Laux

Foundations and Trends(R) in Accounting, 2014, vol. 8, issue 1, 1-73

Abstract: One of the primary roles of corporate boards is to control the processes by which top executives are assessed and if necessary replaced. CEO turnover cannot be viewed in isolation because it affects the behavior of the involved players and hence interacts with other organizational goals. This monograph seeks to synthesize recent research that analyzes these interactions. I focus on a number of recurring themes, including the implications of CEO assessment and replacement on optimal contracting, board monitoring, project selection, financial reporting, and CEO selection.

JEL-codes: G30 G34 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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