The Law and Economics of Public Health

Frank Sloan and Lindsey M. Chepke

Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, 2007, vol. 3, issue 5–6, 331-490

Abstract: The fundamental question addressed by this paper is whether or not and the extent to which imposing tort liability on potential injurers improves the public's health. Conceptually, imposing the threat of litigation on potential injurers gives them an incentive to exercise more care than they would absent the threat. While the conclusion might seem to be obvious at first glance, in reality, the conclusion is far from obvious. For one, insurance coverage may blunt incentives to take care. Also, the tort system may operate far less perfectly than the theory would have it. In the end, the question must be answered on the basis of empirical evidence.

Keywords: Medical malpractice; Tort liability; Product liability; Workers compensation; Public health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:fntmic:0700000020

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