An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, vol. 8, issue 3, 169-230

Abstract: This essay provides an introduction to our recent work on robust mechanism design. The objective is to provide an overview of the research agenda and its results. We present the main results and illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, the single unit auction with interdependent values. In addition, we provide an extended discussion about the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in our work, and the literature at large, in order to explain the common logic of the informational robustness approach that unifies the work

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Robust Mechanism Design; Common Knowledge; Universal Type Space; Interim Equilibrium; Ex Post Equilibrium; Dominant Strategies; Rationalizability; Partial Implementation; Full Implementation; Robust Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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