Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges

Michael Finus ()

International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2008, vol. 2, issue 1, 29-67

Abstract: In recent years, the number of publications that analyze the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game theory has sharply increased. This paper reports on some recent results that shall demonstrate the usefulness but also the limitation of game theory for the analysis of IEAs. It restricts attention to the class of non-cooperative membership models and focuses on the relation between different designs and the success of IEAs. Results are illustrated for the climate change problem with the empirical Stability of Coalitions (STACO) model developed by Dellink et al. (2004). Subsequently, some features of actual treaty-making not considered with this model are discussed with reference to the literature and their importance for future research is highlighted.

Keywords: Game theoretic research; International environmental agreements; Recent results; Critical review; Agenda for future research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 H41 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (133)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jirere:101.00000011

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