 Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game ApproachEmilio Calvo Ramón (emilio.calvo@uv.es) and Santiago Rubio International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2013, vol. 6, issue 4, 289-339 Abstract: This article provides a survey of dynamic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs). The focus is on environmental problems that are caused by a stock pollutant as are the cases of the acid rain and climate change. For this reason, the survey only reviews the literature that utilizes dynamic state-space games to analyze the formation of international agreements to control pollution. The survey considers both the cooperative approach and the noncooperative approach. In the case of the latter, the survey distinguishes between the models that assume binding agreements and those that assume the contrary. An evaluation of the state of the art is presented in the conclusions along with suggestions for future research. Keywords: Externalities; Public goods; Pollution; International environmental agreements; State-space dynamic games; Differential games; Cooperative and noncooperative games; Trigger strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jirere:101.00000053 Access Statistics for this article More articles in International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics from now publishers |
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