Coping with Private Lobbies in Industrial and Product Safety Regulation: A Literature Survey

Julien Jacob and Caroline Orset ()

International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2022, vol. 16, issue 2, 171-227

Abstract: This literature review sheds light on the role of marketing authorisations and liabilities in controlling industry lobby behaviour aimed at enhancing the lobbyists' private interest to the detriment of the public interest. We present two political tools available to public authorities, marketing authorisation and liabilities (civil and criminal) to regulate firms that market products that could be harmful to society. We draw on the economic literature and contributions that study how these policy tools can be used to achieve three main objectives: providing incentives for risk mitigation, fostering innovation and the acquisition of information on unclear risks, and avoiding collusion between public bodies and the companies being regulated. We conclude with a brief discussion of the areas that require more in-depth research on this topic.

Keywords: Industry risks; information acquisition; innovation; liability rules; lobby; scientific uncertainty; law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D72 K32 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/101.00000144 (application/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jirere:101.00000144

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics from now publishers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucy Wiseman ().