Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies

Torsten Persson (), Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2007, vol. 2, issue 2, 155-188

Abstract: We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy where electoral competition inside coalition governments induces higher spending than under single party governments. Policy preferences of parties are endogenous and derived from opportunistic reelection motives. The electoral rule affects government spending, but only indirectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party system and a larger incidence of coalition governments than do majoritarian elections. Empirical evidence from post-war parliamentary democracies strongly supports these predictions.

Keywords: Electoral rules; Party systems; Coalition governments; Fiscal policy; Electoral accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (134)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies (2007)
Working Paper: Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies (2006)
Working Paper: Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies (2006)
Working Paper: Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00006019

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