Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes

Matthew Jackson, Laurent Mathevet and Kyle Mattes

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2007, vol. 2, issue 1, 67-92

Abstract: We provide a set of new models of three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party leaders, nominations by a vote of party members, and nominations by a spending competition among potential candidates. We show that more extreme outcomes can emerge from spending competition than from nominations by votes or by party leaders, and that non-median outcomes can result via any of these processes. When voters (and potential nominees) are free to switch political parties, then median outcomes ensue when nominations are decided by a vote but not when nominations are decided by spending competition.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00006043

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