Deliberation Rules and Voting

Richard Van Weelden

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2008, vol. 3, issue 1, 83-88

Abstract: Most models of pre-vote deliberation assume that voters send messages simultaneously. In practice, however, communication is almost always sequential. This review shows that sequential communication makes it even more difficult to induce truthful communication. Specifically, I show that for any voting rule truthful communication can only be achieved if all voters will agree on the preferred outcome in any state.

Date: 2008
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