Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule

Antoine Loeper

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2013, vol. 8, issue 1, 41-74

Abstract: I consider a heterogeneous federal system in which policy coordination is desirable but underprovided in the absence of a federal intervention. To improve policy coordination, the federal layer can intervene by imposing bounds on local policies. These federal bounds define a restricted policy space within which local jurisdictions have residual discretion. I analyze a voting game in which the federal bounds are determined directly by the citizens via federal majority rule.

Keywords: Federalism; Decentralization; Local discretion; Subsidiarity; Majority rule; Uncovered set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00010096

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