Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory

Roger Myerson

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2013, vol. 8, issue 3, 305-337

Abstract: This paper offers a short introduction to some of the fundamental results of social choice theory. Topics include Nash implementability, monotonic social choice correspondences, the Muller-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, anonymous and neutral social choice correspondences, sophisticated solutions of binary agendas, the top cycle of a tournament, the bipartisan set for two-party competition, and median voter theorems. The paper begins with a simple example to illustrate the importance of multiple equilibria in game-theoretic models of political institutions.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00013006

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