Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing

Leonardo Felli and Rafael Hortala-Vallve

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2016, vol. 11, issue 3, 279-312

Abstract: Whistle-blowing is usually regarded as a way to identify abuse and wrongdoing on the part of governments and corporations. In this paper we show how, at a micro level, whistle-blowing can be used as a designer tool to prevent opportunistic behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure.

Keywords: Collusion; blackmail; whistle-blowing; organizations; mechanism design; communication; opportunistic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00015060

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