Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization

Maria Montero

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2017, vol. 12, issue 3, 325-346

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al. 's (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.

Keywords: Legislative bargaining; Weighted voting; Proportional payoffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00016019

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