Showing Off: Promise and Peril in Unilateral Policymaking

Gleason Judd

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2017, vol. 12, issue 2, 241-268

Abstract: Presidents have substantial unilateral policymaking powers in the United States despite constitutional provisions for checks and balances. I study how electoral concerns encourage officeholders to exercise these powers, using a formal model in which unilateral policymaking skill varies across officeholders and is unknown to voters. Undesirable unilateral action is unavoidable in equilibrium under broad conditions. This perverse behavior occurs when the incumbent acts unilaterally to show off policymaking skill even though unilateral action is inferior policy. Showing off is driven by electoral motivations and occurs because unilateral action is important for re-election. I also characterize conditions under which the incumbent acts unilaterally in equilibrium if and only if it improves voter welfare.

Keywords: Electoral accountability; Presidency; Unilateral policymaking; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00016144

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