The Manchin Paradox

Keith Krehbiel and Sara Krehbiel

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2023, vol. 18, issue 2, 277–293

Abstract: We identify and analyze an enigma of U.S. Senate procedure. Why does its pivotal voter under simple-majority voting prefer that the body makes law using super-majority cloture (e.g., the filibuster, or threat thereof, within the strictures of Rule XXII)? Using a two-stage game of procedural choice and policy choice, we reveal and rationalize the Manchin Paradox and explore its implications for super-majoritarianism and legislative organization.

Keywords: Filibuster; median voter theory; monopoly agenda-setting; pivotal politics; procedural choice; super-majoritarianism; legislative organization; Senate reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00021165

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