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Analyst Recommendations Respond More Symmetrically to Major News After Regulation FD and the Global Settlement: A Replication and Extension of Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, and Rountree (2006)

Yu-An Chen and Dan Palmon

Critical Finance Review, 2022, vol. 11, issue 3-4, 473-504

Abstract: This paper confirms Conrad et al.’s (2006) pre-2000 evidence that analysts are more likely to revise recommendations after major news and downgrade more often than upgrade their recommendations following major negative news. Regulation FD in 2000 and the Global Settlement in 2003 reshaped analysts’ information environment. Regulation FD curtails private information channels between analysts and firm managers. The Global Settlement boosts analyst independence and curbs conflicts of interest through enhanced disclosures regarding analysts’ ratings and the mandated separation of brokerage firms’ research and investment banking activities. Extending Conrad et al.’s (2006) work, this paper shows that analysts react to major news through recommendation revisions as if they have private information even under Regulation FD. However, analysts’ recommendations respond more symmetrically to major news after Regulation FD and the Global Settlement, which supports that these regulatory efforts make analysts more unbiased in releasing their private information following major news.

Keywords: Analysts; Recommendations; Regulation FD; Global settlement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G24 M48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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