Reform Reconsidered: The Effects of Form of Government

Alexander Sahn

Journal of Historical Political Economy, 2023, vol. 3, issue 3, 337-362

Abstract: American municipalities have a wide variety of representative institutions, but do these differences drive policy outcomes? In this article, I investigate whether the relationship between the executive and legislative branches and their control over the bureaucracy affects fiscal outcomes. To do so, I construct a new panel of cities' form of government from 1900 to 1934, a time when two new types — the commission and council-manager forms — arose and were widely adopted. I find limited evidence that changes to the legislative branch's composition and relationship to the bureaucracy impacted cities' fiscal policy, as both expenses and revenues remain unchanged. However, I do find evidence insulating the bureaucracy from electoral control increased capital outlays. I further document that the fragmented control of the bureaucracy did not promote inefficiency, with little difference in spending between policy areas with and without a commissioner. These results highlight the muted effects of form of government institutions on policy.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlhpe:115.00000055

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