Unbreakable Legacies? Redistricting, Political Capital and Political Dynasties

Brenda Van Coppenolle

Journal of Historical Political Economy, 2024, vol. 4, issue 3, 333-359

Abstract: Political dynasties in democracies can rely on shared political capital, such as local connections or the personal vote. This paper provides causal evidence of an institutional reform that destroyed political capital, breaking family legacies. We exploit Britain's 1885 Redistribution of Seats Act, mandating the abolition of constituencies below a population threshold. We find little evidence that redistricting affected incumbents' immediate electoral success. Yet those whose seats were abolished were less likely to have relatives entering the House of Commons afterwards. The differences are not driven by fewer immediate successions in the next election, but by having fewer new relatives over the next few decades. Our paper highlights an understudied long-term consequence of redistricting: shifting the distribution of power across generations.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlhpe:115.00000077

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