Asymmetric Social Distance Effects in the Ultimatum Game

Orestis Vravosinos and Kyriakos Konstantinou

Review of Behavioral Economics, 2019, vol. 6, issue 2, 159–192

Abstract: We argue that in the ultimatum game the effects of altruistic behavior and reciprocity vary more in the spectrum of positively compared to negatively-valenced relationships. Thus, we suggest that social distance effects are asymmetric. Our experimental results support this hypothesis; in the region of positively-valenced relationships, the proposers increase the percentage they offer as relationship quality increases more drastically compared to when the relationship is negatively-valenced, in which case they appear more invariant to relationship effects. Also, by eliciting a minimum share which the responder is willing to accept out of the total sum, we provide clearer results on the social distance and stakes effects on the latter’s behavior. We find a negative effect of relationship quality on the minimum acceptable share. This contradicts a strand of the literature which suggests that closer-“in-group†individuals may be punished more severely, so that cooperation in a group is maintained.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; social distance; other-regarding behavior; relationship; negative valence; asymmetry; stakes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D63 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/105.00000105 (application/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlrbe:105.00000105

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Review of Behavioral Economics from now publishers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucy Wiseman ().