Martyrdom and Rebellious Collective Action

Vladimir V. Maltsev

Review of Behavioral Economics, 2021, vol. 8, issue 2, 111-124

Abstract: The paper analyses the role of martyrdom superstition in fostering rebellious collective action. Rebellions are plagued with problems of free riding, as the benefits of this activity are small, while the costs are high. I argue, however, that a religious society may rationally use the martyrdom superstition to incentivize rebellion. Martyrs gain utility from suffering, which lowers their private costs in case a rebellion does not succeed. If the spiritual benefits from martyrdom are sufficiently high and the costs of failed rebellion are not infinite, then the expected value of rebelling will be higher than the expected value of non-participation. I apply these insights to a radical splinter of the Canadian Doukhobor sect called the Sons of Freedom. Through martyrdom, the anarchic group rebelled against the Canadian government for nearly 80 years, despite their small numbers and low odds of success.

Keywords: Anarchy; superstition; martyrdom; Doukhobors; Sons of Freedom; Russia; Canada (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 N42 P49 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlrbe:105.00000134

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