{'italic': 'Roe v. Wade', '#text': 'Did Strategic Behavior End ?'}

Franklin Mixon, Rand W. Ressler and Benno Torgler

Review of Behavioral Economics, 2025, vol. 12, issue 2, 215-230

Abstract: Roe v. WadeDecision making in the U.S. Supreme court offers a fascinating context in which to apply game theory. Landmark cases in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court are worth exploring in more detail from a game-theoretic point of view. We focus in this paper on the recent and much discussed ruling to overturn and, therefore, the constitutional right to an abortion. Using a game-theoretic framework, we discuss how leaking Justice Samuel Alito’s draft opinion to the national political media can be seen as an unconditional strategic move referred to as cutting off communication, making an action irreversible. In this case, it served conservative justices by cutting off communication between Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature demonstrating how straightforward game theory can be fruitfully applied to the study of constitutional economics.

Date: 2025
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