Coalition Formation and Voting in Public Goods Games

Astrid Dannenberg

Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2012, vol. 2, issue 1, 83-105

Abstract: This study experimentally examines the voluntary formation of coalitions to provide a public good when the coalition members use different voting schemes to determine their commitment. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting public good provision level and social welfare. At first sight, in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that a change in the voting scheme implemented in a coalition does not significantly change the social welfare. However, changing the majority required to determine the coalition efforts alters the depth and breadth of cooperation; coalitions under the unanimity rule are relatively large and implement moderate effort levels while coalitions with majority voting implement high effort levels but attract only a few participants.

Keywords: Public goods; Coalition formation; Cooperation; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000011 (application/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000011

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Strategic Behavior and the Environment from now publishers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucy Wiseman ().