Pollution and Environmentalists' Participation in Emissions Trading Systems

Elias Asproudis and Maria José Gil-Moltó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Maria Jose Gil Molto

Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2014, vol. 4, issue 1, 59-87

Abstract: In this paper, we show that the participation by an environmental group in a permit market does not necessarily result in more investment in abatement or even less pollution. There is a U-shaped relationship between the emission per unit of output and the extra weight given by the environmental group to the reduction of emissions. For high values of this weight, firms invest less in abatement but also produce less. For lower values, firms invest more in abatement but also produce more, which may result in higher emissions levels.

Keywords: Emissions trading systems; abatement; induced technological change; environmental group (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 O31 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000044

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