Exploring Group Cooperation in the Provision of Public Goods

David Zetland

Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2017, vol. 7, issue 1-2, 109-133

Abstract: A novel version of a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game tests how player cooperation responds to changes in incentives, i.e., payoffs that depend on performance relative to different reference groups. Cooperation is greatest when players are competing against players in other four-person groups, intermediate when competition is diffused, and lowest when players compete in a zero-sum game within their own group.

Keywords: Voluntary contribution mechanism; In-group/out-group comparisons; Public goods; Free-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D71 H41 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000076

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