Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the Uncertain Monopolist

Leonard F.S. Wang and John L. Conant

National Tax Journal, 1988, vol. 41, issue 4, 579-81

Abstract: Formulates a model for monopolists which incorporates incentives to reduce tax liability by under-reporting profits through overstatement of production costs.

Date: 1988
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:41:y:1988:i:4:p:579-81

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