Matching Grant Versus Block Grants With Imperfect Information

Nirvikar Singh and Ravi Thomas

National Tax Journal, 1989, vol. 42, issue 2, 191-203

Abstract: A matching grant for an input in public good production is compared with a block grant, where nonobservability of public good outputs and some inputs prevents the use of the optimal grant system. The welfare comparison is shown to depend on the technology of production. The second-best grant is also compared with the optimal grant.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:42:y:1989:i:2:p:191-203

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