Approximately Efficient Federal Matching Grants for Subnational Public Assistance

Mark Shroder

National Tax Journal, 1992, vol. 45, issue 2, 155-65

Abstract: Public finance authorities long have held that income redistribution should be a central-government function, in part because migration between jurisdictions may lead to fiscal externalities. This paper shows that approximately efficient matching rates for subnational public assistance, which adjust the tax price of welfare in each state for the potential externalities, are feasible.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:45:y:1992:i:2:p:155-65

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