Federalism and Reductions in the Federal Budget

John Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld

National Tax Journal, 1996, vol. 49, issue 2, 289-302

Abstract: Assesses two ways (mandates and grants) in which federalist principles affect the budget and deficit at the federal level, the relationship between the federal and local governments, and the assumption of state responsibility for a number of public regulations.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:49:y:1996:i:2:p:289-302

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