Voluntary Binding Arbitration as an Alternative to Tax Court Litigation

Richard Sansing

National Tax Journal, 1997, vol. 50, issue 2, 279-96

Abstract: Develops and analyzes a model of Tax Court litigation, in which each side possesses private information regarding the facts under dispute. Characterizes equilibrium behavior for both conventional and final-offer arbitration. Compares the results of the two arbitration methods, both in terms of the probability that the parties will agree to binding arbitration and the outcomes of the two arbitration methods.

Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1086/NTJ41789257 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.1086/NTJ41789257 (text/html)
Access is restricted to subscribers and members of the National Tax Association.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:50:y:1997:i:2:p:279-96

Access Statistics for this article

National Tax Journal is currently edited by Stacy Dickert-Conlin and William M. Gentry

More articles in National Tax Journal from National Tax Association, National Tax Journal Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The University of Chicago Press ().