Public Finance and Public Choice

James M. Poterba

National Tax Journal, 1998, vol. 51, issue 2, 391-96

Abstract: This paper explores the contribution that public choice models can make to the traditional efficiency and distributional analyses of tax policy. It notes the relative lack of attention to political economy issues in public finance, at least in comparison with other policy-oriented subfields in economics. It then discusses two key insights that emerge from public choice models of taxation. The first is the notion that different tax systems may be associated with different opportunities for political rent seeking, and the second is the possibility that actual tax systems equate the marginal political cost of raising revenue from different tax instruments, rather than the marginal efficiency cost. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the role of traditional efficiency and distributional analyses in contributing to tax policymaking, even in a political world.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:51:y:1998:i:2:p:391-96

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