Financing Universal Health Care in the United States: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Efficiency and Distributional Effects

Charles L. Ballard and John H. Goddeeris

National Tax Journal, 1999, vol. 52, issue 1, 31-51

Abstract: We study the efficiency and distributional effects of financing universal health-insurance coverage, using a computational general equilibrium model of the United States for 1991, with considerable disaggregation among families. Aggregate efficiency losses (primarily from labor supply distortions) range from 0.2 percent to nearly 1 percent of net output. Losses are considerably smaller for a "mandate-with-tax-credit" plan than for full tax finance. All plans redistribute in favor of the poor. The mandate with credit is much better for the highest income groups, but worse for the lower-middle class. The elderly lose in all plans we consider.

Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1086/NTJ41789374 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.1086/NTJ41789374 (text/html)
Access is restricted to subscribers and members of the National Tax Association.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:52:y:1999:i:1:p:31-51

Access Statistics for this article

National Tax Journal is currently edited by Stacy Dickert-Conlin and William M. Gentry

More articles in National Tax Journal from National Tax Association, National Tax Journal Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The University of Chicago Press ().