The Tax Shelter Problem

Joseph Bankman

National Tax Journal, 2004, vol. 57, issue 4, 925-36

Abstract: This article offers a definition and examples of the modern tax shelter and summarizes the anti–tax shelter weapons in the government's arsenal. Particular attention is given to the economic substance doctrine, which allows the government to attack transactions that comply with the literal language of the law. The battle between taxpayers and the government is described as a multi–player, multi–period game. Recent moves by the government have greatly reduced the payoff to shelters set up by high net–worth individuals. The corporate shelter market is more robust, as taxpayers have been able to exploit flaws in the economic substance doctrine. One attractive policy option is to follow the lead of California and increase the cost of shelters by increasing the penalties.

Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2004.4.08 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2004.4.08 (text/html)
Access is restricted to subscribers and members of the National Tax Association.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:57:y:2004:i:4:p:925-36

Access Statistics for this article

National Tax Journal is currently edited by Stacy Dickert-Conlin and William M. Gentry

More articles in National Tax Journal from National Tax Association, National Tax Journal Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The University of Chicago Press ().