Can Competition Tame the Leviathan? Evidence From California's Proposition 39

Ed Balsdon and Eric Brunner ()

National Tax Journal, 2005, vol. 58, issue 4, 627-42

Abstract: In 2000, Californians voted on Proposition 39, a statewide ballot initiative that called for reducing the supermajority vote requirement on local school bond measures from two–thirds to 55 percent. This paper develops a model of voting behavior on that initiative. Our model predicts that support for lowering the supermajority vote requirement should increase as the degree of competition among school districts increases. Our analysis of vote returns from Proposition 39 supports this hypothesis. All else equal, moving from an area with little or no competition to an area with significant competition leads to a 13 percentage point increase in support for Proposition 39.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:58:y:2005:i:4:p:627-42

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