Preferential Tax Regimes With Asymmetric Countries

Sam Bucovetsky and Andreas Haufler

National Tax Journal, 2007, vol. 60, issue 4, 789-95

Abstract: Current policy initiatives taken by the EU and the OECD aim at abolishing preferential corporate tax regimes. This note extends Keen’s (2001) analysis of symmetric capital tax competition under preferential (or discriminatory) and non–discriminatory tax regimes to allow for countries of different size. Even though size asymmetries imply a redistribution of tax revenue from the larger to the smaller country, a non–discrimination policy is found to have similar effects as in the symmetric model: it lowers the average rate of capital taxation and thus makes tax competition more aggressive in both the large and the small country.

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2007.4.06 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2007.4.06 (text/html)
Access is restricted to subscribers and members of the National Tax Association.

Related works:
Working Paper: Preferential tax regimes with asymmetric countries (2007)
Working Paper: Preferential Tax Regimes with Asymmetric Countries (2006)
Working Paper: Preferential tax regimes with asymmetric countries (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:60:y:2007:i:4:p:789-95

Access Statistics for this article

National Tax Journal is currently edited by Stacy Dickert-Conlin and William M. Gentry

More articles in National Tax Journal from National Tax Association, National Tax Journal Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The University of Chicago Press ().